This study demonstrates that suitable professional expertise on corporate boards can have a significant impact on firm outcomes. We examine diversity of expertise on boards, its link to shareholder value, and extend the literature by introducing corporate lifecycle and industry sectors to explore when specific types of expertise matter. Exploring dominant cash flow patterns, we find a strong link between firm value and financial, mining and engineering expertise of early stage firm boards across ASX-listed companies in 2014. We also find a relationship between firm performance and financial, mining, and other unclassified board expertise for companies in the shake-out stage.
Is there a relationship between firm performance and the range of expertise that directors bring to corporate boards? Whilst previous studies have shown no overall or cross-sectional link between general board composition and firm value, there is evidence in the literature that taking a more granular view of how boards are structured and operate can uncover structures that enhance company performance and value. Early research suggests a significant relationship for companies experiencing major events such as takeovers and CEO turnover (Brickley, et al., 1994 , Byrd and Hickman, 1992 , Kosnik, 1987 , Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990 , Weisbach, 1988 . Studies examining more nuanced characteristics such as board committee composition (Klein, 1998) and industry experience on specific subcommittees (Wang, et al., 2013) have found that independent directors enhance value on audit and compensation committees. The domain of professional expertise was highlighted by Anderson et al. (2011) who in examining occupational heterogeneity on boards discovered that investors value diverse talents and perspectives that directors bring to their monitoring and advising duties. Their study suggests that whilst professional diversity introduces greater coordination problems and communication challenges, they are counterbalanced by improved problem-solving, strategy formulation and resource utilisation. In Australia, prior research has focused on the presence of accounting expertise on boards with Aldamen et al. (2012) This analysis contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it will use a sample of ASX listed companies from 2014. Previous Australian studies on expertise diversity and firm performance use data from periods prior to the second and third editions of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (Christensen, et al., 2010 , Cotter and Silvester, 2003 , Gray and Nowland, 2015 . The new edition was published in March 2014 and the guidance to disclose and discuss the mix of skills and diversity for the board by using a skills matrix was changed from commentary to a specific recommendation. This development represents a move towards a more prescriptive approach with a view to increasing accountability towards investors, but also in order to identify gaps in the board's combined skillset.
Second, this study adds further granularity to Gray and Nowland's (2015) study on diversity of expertise on ASX boards. It examined whether greater diversity enhances shareholder ii value by using various expertise diversity indices and finding that shareholders benefit from expertise diversity on boards only within a subset of specialist business expertise. This analysis suggests that companies in different industries may benefit from different sets of skills and examines the relationship between firm value and the existence of specific skills on the board given the company's industry sector or stage in corporate lifecycle.
Third, this study introduces the concept of corporate lifecycle in examining board diversity of expertise as it relates to firm value. It is likely that companies will require a different board skillset depending on whether they are experiencing a steady growth phase or operate a mature business. This study will examine the relationship between firm value or firm performance and the existence of specific skills on the board, given the company's phase in its corporate lifecycle.
In contrast to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are not mandatory for listed companies in Australia. Accordingly, there is likely to be more variation in governance structures because companies can voluntarily select the recommendations they adhere to. This study will provide critical input to boards of directors and help them better understand the implications of adopting specific recommendations and deviating from others.
Related literature
The past three decades have seen a steadily increasing focus on corporate governance by practitioners and likely as a result of this interest a consistently growing volume of academic research. The unique role of the board of directors in a corporate governance context was identified early on, as this is the group bearing ultimate responsibility in the system of internal controls and setting the rules of the game for the CEO (Jensen, 1993) The remit of the board of directors can be encapsulated in four key areas this study will refer to as the Four Cs: control, counsel, connections and compliance, each underpinned by complementary and at times competing theories that have deep roots in the corporate governance literature (Mallin, 2010, Monks and Minow, 2011) . The first two functions focus on internal activities of monitoring management on behalf of shareholders (control), and providing mentoring (counsel). The second two emphasise the external roles that boards perform: offering external linkages (connections) and ensuring adherence to laws and regulations (compliance).
Agency theory -exercising control
The board's role in exercising control and providing monitoring over management is most commonly evaluated through agency theory. A principal-agent problem is inherent when ownership and control of assets are separated and shareholders are unable to affect practical control over management: the board's main role is to oversee management, safeguard shareholder rights and ensure their equitable treatment (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . This conflict also encompasses asymmetric information and potential moral hazard, where the agent (director) has better information and possesses the trust of the principal and hence is in a position to act contrary to the interest of the principal.
The contrasting stewardship theory posits that managers are inherently honest and driven by maintaining and enhancing their professional reputation. Accordingly, the theory suggests that managers will not engage in opportunistic or self-enriching behaviour to the detriment of the company or their own reputation; they are good agents maximising shareholder value and any further monitoring is unnecessary and increases transaction cost.
While many of the potential problems may be overcome through contract, it is not feasible to negotiate and enforce a comprehensive agreement for every potential scenario. A better solution is to develop overarching mechanisms in order to govern stakeholder relationships and minimise conflicts; this is the domain of corporate governance.
Resource dependency theory -providing counsel and delivering connections
Companies operate in an ecosystem. Whilst the basic resources of capital, labour, and raw material are still important, their success increasingly depends on more nuanced ones.
Strategic relationships with other businesses, regulators and the government are just as critical and so is the quality of their labour force in terms of their connectedness in the community. Resource dependence theory captures at least two of the four critical elements identified as key responsibilities of directors. Companies benefit from their professional expertise as they provide counsel and mentoring to management and outside directors can offer connections by delivering essential linkages through their professional networks across industry, regulators and government (Hillman, et al., 2000, Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) .
Experienced professionals on boards can offer their guidance and facilitate relationships with providers of a wide array of external capabilities that can help companies succeed. As an additional facet of the resource dependency theory's practical application, companies also benefit from an enhanced reputation when well-regarded directors join the board (Pfeffer, 1972) .
Corporate Law -ensuring compliance
Directors oversee management on behalf of shareholders with a view to maximising shareholder value whilst giving due regard to the environment, fair trading, operational health and safety matters, legal issues and the economic environment. Given that the conduct of the board of directors and management have an impact on such wide ranging matters, the freedom given to this stakeholder group needs to be balanced with the need for holding them accountable as they discharge the duties of their office. As a corporate governance tool, law has developed over time to impose standards on company directors and best practice recommendations have been developed to incentivise companies to comply, with the promise of increased shareholder wealth as a reward (Agrawal and Knoebler, 1996) .
Board heterogeneity and fit for purpose
Both the agency theory and resource dependency perspectives suggest that more diverse boards would lead to desired outcomes such as increased shareholder wealth and firm performance. Varied backgrounds -be it ethnicity, gender, age or expertise -bring fresh perspectives that may not have been considered by more homogenous boards (Carter, et al., 2003) . Directors that are less connected to the CEO and top management would be expected to be stronger monitors. More and tougher monitoring, however, may be suboptimal given the specific company, leading to the notion that boards need to be fit for purpose and that different stages in corporate lifecycle and different industries may all need different boards. Accordingly, treating board structure and diversity measures as either independent or dependent variables can both lead to valid lines of enquiry.
Taxonomy of Board Structure and Composition
The domain of board diversity typically examines various aspects of board structure and composition to identify a link between the diversity measure as independent variable and measures of firm performance. The market performance measure classically used is Tobin's Q, and the accounting measure typically investigated is return on assets (ROA). The overall aim of these studies is to uncover a model board structure that leads to higher firm value and improved company performance.
Board structure literature has primarily investigated aspects of board size, board composition and internal dynamics. The common element across these studies is the focus on a subset of firms sharing similar characteristics. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) directed their attention to small and mid-sized firms in Finland to find a negative link between board size and profitability, while Yermack (1996) found a similar conclusion for US industrial corporations; Alvarez, Anson and Mendez (1997) studied listed Spanish firms and concluded a non-linear relationship. Hunter (1997) investigated rural electricity distributors in the US and showed that large boards have an adverse impact on firm efficiency. In looking at board composition and investigating director independence Baysinger and Butler (1985) find a mild, lagged effect on organisational performance for 266 major US companies. Further studies in this area and those examining the internal dynamics of boards find no cross-sectional relationship between the board feature in question and firm performance when looking at large, heterogeneous samples (Baysinger and Butler, 1985 , De Andres, et al., 2005 , Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988 , Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 , John and Senbet, 1998 , Klein, 1998 , Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997 , Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990 , Vafeas, 1999 , Weisbach, 1988 .
Aspects of board composition that have been linked to company value include directors' gender, age, entrenchment status, professional background, expertise and their affiliation to the company (Alves, et al., 2015 , Christensen, et al., 2015 , Klein, 1998 . It has been suggested that inside directors (current employees), grey directors (affiliated nonemployees) or independent directors (unaffiliated non-employees) may play a different role and have an impact on shareholder wealth (Faleye, 2015) . Further, outsiders can be classified based on their background as either being corporate, financial or neutral outsiders (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990 ) which in turn may prove relevant in terms of how they add value.
Board Diversity of Expertise
Research studies on the professional background and expertise of directors have been limited to date. Gray and Nowland (2015) provide a summary of the Australian research that has focused on specific types of expertise such as accounting and political background (Aldamen, et al., 2012 , Christensen, et al., 2010 , Gray, et al., 2016 . They also provide the first comprehensive categorisation of director expertise and identify 11 distinct groups: academics, accountants, bankers, consultants, doctors, engineers, executives, lawyers, other CEOs, politicians and scientists. Their study found that diversity of expertise on boards had no overall impact on firm performance, but a negative relationship was found between nonbusiness related expertise and firm performance as measured ROA.
International studies that look at the background of board members provide critical insight into some of the underlying reasons behind director appointments and make inferences about the inner working of boards based on the skillset of its members. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) point to the prevalence of directors with backgrounds in politics for companies with significant government contracts; qualifications in law for firms where environmental regulation is higher, while Fich (2005) documents positive market response to the appointment of successful CEOs of other companies. Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) investigate the presence of financial expertise on boards and the resulting increased external funding, but find that it does not necessarily benefit shareholders.
Linking Boards to Firm Performance
The relationship between the composition of the board of directors and firm performance has been the subject of numerous studies over the past three decades and the only consistent conclusion has been the lack of compelling evidence for any overall or cross-sectional link.
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) there is no compelling relationship between board composition and firm performance by purely looking at the balance of inside and outside directors. Research conducted by Agrawal and Knoebler (1996) suggests that there is a negative relationship between firm performance and the percentage of outsiders on boards and concludes that board structures are suboptimal because they are determined internally by shareholders. These outcomes suggest taking a more granular view of directorships -'adding structure' as suggested by Klein (1998) -and examining the roles directors play by going beyond merely classifying directors as insiders and outsiders. A more in-depth analysis could be undertaken by examining memberships of board subcommittees, attendance records and the professional expertise of board members serving on subcommittees. Klein (1998) investigates the role of the insider director by observing their committee membership. He posits that an inside directors' activity are more consistent with profit maximising behaviour when they fall within domains of advising and strategy, such as participating in the work of a long-term investment committee as opposed to serving on a monitoring committee such as the executive remuneration committee. Consistent with this theory, Klein (1998) finds a strong positive link between inside directors on finance and investment subcommittees and measures of both stock market and accounting performance.
Gap in Knowledge
There is a growing volume of literature studying board composition and linking it to shareholder wealth. This study builds on recent work on board structure, diversity of expertise and director selection to apply it in the context corporate lifecycles. The SarbanesOxley Act 2002, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2014 all promote the notion of independent directors on boards. Literature, however, suggests that truly independent boards may miss out on expertise contributed by internal directors and those with technology know-how possessing firm-specific information and deeper insight into the company's operations, which would in turn make them both better monitors and advisors (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . This study will investigate whether firm-specific information and deeper insight offered by professionals with domain specific expertise are important for companies depending on their corporate lifecycle phase.
The study will introduce the concept of corporate lifecycle and its interaction with board expertise as it relates to firm value and firm performance. It is likely that companies will require a different board skillset in different industries and stages of corporate lifecycle. This study will examine the relationship between the existence of specific skills on the board and firm value given the company's industry and lifecycle.
In an extreme view, no two firms are exactly the same and hence each of them will have its own unique optimal board structure and composition. This study will attempt to uncover common success factors to improve firm value and performance.
Corporate lifecycle
Corporate lifecycle literature describes evolving internal and external factors that influence how businesses develop. Some of these factors are strategic decisions taken by the firm; others are related to its endowment of financial and human capital, and yet others relate to external factors such as the macroeconomic environment or competitive forces (Dickinson, 2011) . Firms enter different stages in their lifecycle as these factors change, and when they do, boards need an alternative set of skills driven by the resource dependency theory. There is an equally plausible scenario where the appointment of a new director results in a different aggregate board skillset that leads to a new phase in the firm's lifecycle. Regardless of the direction of causality, different stages of lifecycle are likely to be associated with a different collective set of expertise at the board level.
Studies have used a ranking method to allocate companies in different life stages without defining key characteristics of a specific lifecycle stage. Variables used by Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) in ranking companies included dividend payouts, sales growth, capital expenditure as a ratio of firm value, market-to-book ratio, age and abnormal stock returns as lifecycle stage proxies. A shortcoming of this approach is that sorting does not capture essential internal and external factors that pivot firms from one stage to the next; they merely represent their relative standing compared to other companies in the given sample. Dickinson (2011) developed a theoretically more robust approach using lifecycle theory as her starting point and examining firms' most likely cash flow characteristics in each phase. First, the sign of operating, investing and financing cash flows are observed and in the next stage they are mapped to the five lifecycle stages defined by Gort and Klepper (1982) . The method has been applied in the wider accounting and finance literature, contemporary corporate governance studies (Al-Hadi, et al., 2016 , Hasan, et al., 2015 , Koh, et al., 2015 , Oler and Picconi, 2014 Building on Dickinson (2011) and Gort and Klepper (1982) the following section will provide an overview of corporate lifecycle stages and describe cash flow characteristics representative of each phase. Table 1 provides a summary overview of these patterns.
Early stage
Companies in the introduction stage of their development often experience negative operating cash flows due to inconsistency of revenues and uncertainty about their cost structure. They deploy capital to develop production capacity and acquire long-term assets that are recorded as negative investment cash flows. Lacking consistent operating cash flows, these firms need sources of financing to grow and will access debt and capital markets as sources of funding; the net impact in this stage is positive financing cash flows.
Growth phase
Firms with proven business models and customers start attracting consistent positive operating cash flows. Driven by this optimism, they will continue investment activity, scale production, and work towards achieving economies of scale in order to deter competitors.
The sources of this new investment are positive net operating cash flows and cash from financing activities. Pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer internal to external financing and will access debt before they issue equity in order to benefit from the tax shield of interest payments, balanced with the risk of over-borrowing (Myers, 1984) .
Mature firms
Businesses continue to enjoy positive cash flows in the mature lifecycle stage and benefit from certainty in cost structure and potential revenues. While they are likely to continue their investing activities to maintain assets, mature firms, by definition, have access to fewer positive net present value projects that would warrant external financing and hence net cash from financing activities will become negative. Firms in this stage shift focus towards retiring debt, paying dividends or engaging in share buybacks.
Decline stage
A firm in its decline stage experiences weakening growth rates and deteriorating pricing power. These symptoms can stem from product obsolescence or increased competition and result in negative operating cash flows. In order to service debt or repurchase shares, firms may need to liquidate assets and for the first time since the company's inception, investing cash flows will be positive. In this lifecycle phase, providers of capital may receive payments, loans may be renegotiated, or new preferred equity instruments are issued.
Financing cash flows may be either positive or negative depending on the net impact of the two factors.
Shake-out stage
There are three remaining cash flow pattern combinations that the literature does not specifically map to a lifecycle stage. Dickinson (2011) calls this the shake-out stage and maps to Gort and Klepper's (1982) Stage 4, characterised by the non-equilibrium phase of negative net market entry by firms and potential structural changes in the industry. In this phase, either all cash flows are positive; all are negative; or positive operating and investing cash flows are combined with negative financing cash flows. Illustrating professional expertise differences across industries, the average board of ten in the materials industry would have one finance expert, two accounting experts, one lawyer, two directors with a mining background, one engineer and three directors with other expertise. Health Care sector board composition is not as well understood, comprising of six directors with unclassified expertise, one with a finance background, and two accounting experts complemented by a lawyer.
Professional expertise across industries

Professional expertise across corporate lifecycles
In addition to director expertise data, financial data was obtained from the Morningstar database for 1,992 ASX listed companies including total current assets, total equity, total liabilities, cash from operating, financing and investing activities, price to book value and return on assets for 2014. Tobin's Q and the natural logarithm of total assets were calculated as additional variables. Of the 764 entries in the SIRCA director expertise dataset, 717 had matching financial data in the Morningstar dataset, which were used to create the final dataset that encompasses 4,890 directorships. Financial variables were winsorised at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles with the exception of total assets. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2 . A brief analysis comparing the full sample of 1,992 firms and the subsample was undertaken and showed that the final sample has a bias towards larger firms, possibly as the 47 missing firms from the Morningstar dataset included companies that were either delisted or underwent a name change due to a reverse takeover during 2014. This bias is not expected to skew the analysis, as total assets are set as a control variable and cash flow data are in a comparable range for both samples. companies are significantly more diverse in terms of professional expertise on their boards.
13 Table 3 Percentage of firms with types of professional expertise on the board across industries This table shows board composition and characteristics for all 764 ASX-listed firms in 2014 and separated by industry sector. In case the mean for the industry is significantly higher (lower) than overall means using a one-sample t-test, the results are denoted to show significance at the 1% +++, 5% ++ and 10% + levels for higher means (1% ---, 5% --, 10% -for lower means). The Appendix includes detailed variable definitions. This table shows board composition and characteristics for all 717 ASX-listed firms in 2014 and separated by corporate lifecycle. In case the mean for the lifecycle is significantly higher (lower) than overall means using a one-sample t-test, the results are denoted to show significance at the 1% + + +, 5% + + and 10% + levels for higher means (1% ---, 5% --, 10% -for lower means). The Appendix includes detailed variable definitions.
Professional expertise diversity and firm value
This section will examine the link between various aspects of professional expertise on boards and firm value using the sample of 717 ASX listed firms. Descriptive statistics provided in Table 2 show that the mean (median) firm has total assets of $677 billion ($140 million), total equity of $820 million ($90 million), positive operating cash flows, negative investing cash flows and negative (positive) financing cash flows. The average firm has a market capitalisation of $1.6 billion ($112 million); a Tobin's Q of 2.17 (1.15). It achieved a return on assets of -28% (2%) and an asset growth of 15% (2%) in 2014. The average number of the directors is 6.82 with an expertise count of 7.08 across 3.18 different types represented on the board. The median industry adjusted number of expertise is 1.02 and the median lifecycle adjusted number of expertise is 0.99.
As described in the previous section, board structure and composition differ across industries and corporate lifecycles. Gaps in current knowledge as highlighted in the introduction motivated this study to determine whether there is a relationship between expertise diversity, the presence of specific professional expertise on the board and firm performance; it led to forming the below hypotheses. Consistent with previous studies, the accounting measure of firm performance will be return on assets (ROA) and the share market measure of firm value will be Tobin's Q; industry, firm and board level variables will be used to control for fixed effects.
H0 : Firm performance is not related to expertise diversity or the presence of professional expertise on corporate boards.
HA1 : When industry sector is considered, there is a relationship between firm performance and expertise diversity on corporate boards.
HA2 : When stages of corporate lifecycle are considered, there is a relationship between firm performance and expertise diversity on corporate boards.
HA3 : There is a relationship between firm performance and the presence of specific professional expertise on the board of companies that are in a given lifecycle phase.
The hypotheses developed above are empirically tested using OLS regression analysis. The first model is given in Equation 1:
Where Firm Performancei is Tobin's Q and ROA, the Expertise Diversity Measurei is either the number of expertise types on the board, the sum of expertise types, the industry adjusted number of expertise types, the lifecycle adjusted number of expertise types or an expertise index for Firmi. Board Factorsi is a set of board specific variables including board size, the percentage of females, percentage of independent directors, percentage of board members with other directorships and a dummy variable indicating that the CEO is also the chairman of the board. The Firm Fixed Effectsi control variable group includes the natural logarithm of total assets, annual growth in total assets, debt-to-asset ratio, and ROA when the dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Industry Factorsi is a set of dummy variables indicating GICS industry sector.
In the first stage, Gray and Nowland's (2015) analysis using Allocating the sum of expertise across two subsets to include business specific expertise (finance, accounting and legal) in one group and other expertise types in a second group following the method suggested by Anderson et al (2011) , no significant relationship was found with shareholder wealth. While Gray and Nowland (2015) detected a negative relationship between other types of expertise (HR, mining, engineering and others) and return on assets, this study found no significant relationship.
In the second stage, industry control variables are replaced with corporate lifecycle indicators and the hypotheses developed above are empirically tested using OLS regression analysis. The second model to be estimated is given in Equation 2:
Where Lifecycle Factorsi is a set of dummy variables indicating corporate lifecycle based on Dickinson (2011) . The OLS regression analysis concludes the lack of relationship between firm performance or shareholder wealth and expertise diversity on boards when the industry control variable is replaced with the corporate lifecycle control variable.
In the third stage a model is developed to test the link between firm performance and expertise given the phase in the company's lifecycle. The third model to be estimated is given in Equation 3:
Where Firm Performancei denotes Tobin's Q and ROA, Director Expertisei is a set of dummy variables indicating the presence of financial, accounting, legal, HR, mining, engineering or other expertise on the board and Corporate Lifecyclei is a set of dummy variables indicating that a firm is either in the early, growth, mature, shake-out or decline stage. The Firm Fixed
Effectsi control variable group includes the natural logarithm of total assets, annual growth in total assets and debt-to-asset ratio. to firm performance at early stage and shake-out firms and there is also a negative relationship between firm performance and accounting expertise at companies in the decline stage.
In addition to firm value as measured by Tobin's Q, this study also investigated professional expertise on boards in relation to firm performance as measured by return on assets and found that it is positively related to engineering and other expertise on shake-out firm boards, negatively related to financial and mining expertise of shakeout firms; mining and other expertise on firms in the decline stage, and engineering expertise at early stage firms.
The results of the control variables suggest that firm value is positively related to leverage and growth, and negatively related to firm size. Firm performance is positively related to size and growth, while negatively related to leverage. asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Table 7 in the Appendix includes detailed variable definitions.
Conclusions
The relationship between composition of the board of directors and firm performance has been the subject of numerous studies over the past three decades and the only consistent conclusion has been the lack of compelling evidence for any overall or cross-sectional link. This suggested taking a more granular view of directorships and examining the role that directors may play given their professional background. A more in-depth analysis was undertaken by examining the expertise of board members taking into account the company's industry and its lifecycle stage.
This study provided evidence that accounting and finance were the most dominant types of expertise on ASX boards in 2014. Expertise diversity was shown to be highest for growth stage and mature firms and companies in the energy and utilities sectors. In contrast, health care firms and companies in the shake-out lifecycle stage had the most homogenous boards. The analysis also indicated that shareholders benefit when early stage firms have finance and engineering expertise among their directors. It was shown, however, that mere diversity of expertise is not related to either firm value or return on assets; it is the presence of specific expertise that matters.
This study extends the academic literature and provides practical advice to investors and company directors. It builds on previous research on professional expertise at the board level and extends the literature by introducing the concept of corporate lifecycles to deepen our understanding of how boards add value. In order to fulfil their key roles of providing counsel and offering external connections, boards need to have the appropriate mix of expertise. An insight into the composition of ASX company boards was offered with a dual purpose. It highlighted best practice for private companies contemplating public listing and for public companies it offered an analysis of board structures that lead to enhanced firm outcomes.
Having identified some of the structures that lead to desired results; further research is warranted to uncover how these directors add value in their capacity as mentors and connectors given the benefit of their professional background. 
